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Failing Fast in the Gulf: Entrepreneurship, Bankruptcy, and 
Islamic Law 
I. Introduction 
 One evening in Manama, Bahrain, I came across a young man selling food from a booth 
in the popular Block 338 restaurant district. He had started his business when he was only seven 
years old. This young man was but an example of the thriving entrepreneurial spirit in the Gulf. 
Yet, despite such anecdotes, the Gulf States1 are not typically seen as a hotspot for 
entrepreneurship. One reason that Silicon Valley has been so successful at cultivating startup 
companies is because the business ecosystem there has reduced the costs of becoming an 
entrepreneur, largely through reducing the cost of becoming a failed entrepreneur. Operating 
under the premise that “an economy unwilling to shoulder the costs of certain entrepreneurial 
failures is not likely to reap the benefits of a vibrant entrepreneurial sector and the growth it may 
bring,”2 this paper explores how Gulf economies can reduce the cost of entrepreneurial failure. 
In particular, I focus on the interplay between bankruptcy law and entrepreneurship and how 
Islamic law affects this dynamic. In Section 2, I discuss the role that failure plays in 
entrepreneurship and why entrepreneurs need to “fail fast.” Section 3 focuses on bankruptcy law 
and the broad application of Islamic principles. Finally, Section 4 adds some more specific 
nuance by looking at other programs in Qatar, Bahrain, and the UAE that could help lower the 
costs of becoming an entrepreneur. 
                                                          
1 In researching for this paper, I visited Qatar, Bahrain, and the UAE. When I use the term “Gulf States” I am 
generally referring to these three countries but the paper is also applicable to other countries within the region. 
2 Seung-Hyun Lee, Mike W. Peng, & Jay B. Barney, Bankruptcy Law and Entrepreneurship Development: A Real 
Options Perspective, 32 THE ACAD. MGMT. REV. 257, 267 (2007); see also, Michael H. Morris, Xaver Neumeyer, & 
Donald F. Kuratko, A Portfolio Perspective on Entrepreneurship and Economic Development, 45 SMALL BUS. 
ECON. 713 (2015). 
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II. Failing Fast and Bankruptcy 
Why do we need entrepreneurs? 
For decades, economists have held that “[e]ntrepreneurship is widely seen as one of the 
most important drivers of economic growth.”3 Even if we assume this maxim is true, it does not 
by itself mean that society would be better off with higher levels of entrepreneurship. Maybe we 
already have an optimal, or super-optimal, number of entrepreneurs. In theory, decreasing the 
cost of entrepreneurship only provides a social benefit if the aggregate benefit of the marginally 
added successful entrepreneurs is greater than the aggregate cost of the marginally added 
unsuccessful entrepreneurs. Lee, et al. view this dilemma through a lens of uncertainty. Despite 
all the alleged expertise in Silicon Valley, it is extremely difficult to predict which startups will 
be successful and which ones will fail. But, Lee et al. argue that “uncertainty is not always a bad 
thing even when most entrepreneurs fail if a few successful entrepreneurs can generate more 
value to a society than when all entrepreneurs survive, but hardly add value.”4 Lee, et al. 
conclude that, because society cannot predict which startups will be the winners, the optimal 
strategy is to cultivate a large number of entrepreneurs.5 The expectation here is that the benefit 
of discovering the next Google will make up for all the failed startups along the way.  
                                                          
3 Seung-Hyun Lee, et al, supra note 2, at 506 (citing JOSEPH SCHUMPTER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND 
DEMOCRACY (1942)). 
4 Id. at 507 (citing, Rita Gunther McGrath, Falling Forward: Real Options Reasoning and Entrepreneurial Failure 
24 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 13 (1999)). 
5 This assertion should come as no surprise to venture capitalists whose business model is based on casting a wide 
net in hopes that the rare success will provide them with such a great return that it pays for all the other failures. 
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Lean startups and the risk of entrepreneurship 
In recent years, American entrepreneurs—mostly concentrated in Silicon Valley—have 
begun converting to the “lean startup” methodology.6 In a nutshell, the lean startup is one that 
forsakes the front-end-loaded nature of a traditional business plan and instead chooses to hit the 
ground running. A lean startup is characterized by “its principles of failing fast and continually 
learning.”7 For a startup, there are two types of failure—what I will call “micro-failures” and 
“complete failures.” Micro-failures are those decision made during the course of business that 
harm the company in some way, usually in the form of losing money. Complete failure occurs 
when the culmination of the startup's business decisions force it to go out of business. This paper 
will focus on bankruptcy as a form of complete failure but there are other ways a startup can fail 
completely.8 
A lean startups can protect itself from micro-failures.9 A traditional business approaches 
failure by mapping out all of its perceived risks and avoiding movement in a direction that 
presents a high level of risk. A lean startup will instead create a business hypothesis, start 
operating with a minimum viable product built to serve that hypothesis, and make adjustments as 
they seem necessary.10 Operating under this model, a lean startup treats micro-failures as if they 
were scientific experiments—the negation of a hypothesis provides valuable evidence. What 
would traditionally be regarded as a failure is instead treated as a cheaply obtained lesson of 
                                                          
6 Steven Blank, Why the Lean Start-Up Changes Everything, HARV. BUS. REV. May 2013, at 65, 66. Stephen Blank 
popularized the concept of the lean startup but it has been the subject of surprisingly little academic study. 
7 Id. (emphasis added). 
8 Another example of complete failure could be when an equity-financed company can no longer attract new 
investors and does not have self-sufficient levels of revenue. 
9 Blank, supra note 3. 
10 Id. at 67. 
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what practices should be avoided going forward.11 The lean startup cannot, however, insulate 
itself from complete failure. At some point, the costs of operating a minimum viable product will 
be greater than the startup can afford and it will have to shut down. The fact of the matter is that 
somewhere between thirty and eighty percent of American startups ultimately end in complete 
failure.12 
There is no way to completely eliminate the risk of starting a business,13 but there are 
several exogenous factors that can reduce the cost of complete failure borne by entrepreneurs. 
Broadly speaking, there are two buckets of factors that affect the costs of failure: social 
dynamics, and laws/institutions. Social factors mainly take the form of risk-tolerance and the 
amount of shame directed at failed entrepreneurs. This paper will focus on the laws and 
institutions that promote entrepreneurship, but it is worth noting that social factors in the Gulf 
region do not appear to put a large price on failure. In fact, a study conducted by the Global 
Entrepreneurship Monitor found that only 25.5 percent of respondents in Qatar14 would refuse to 
start a new business out of fear of failure.15 In the U.S., a full 29.7% of those surveyed reported 
that fear of failure would stop them from starting a business, suggesting that the social dynamics 
in the Gulf do not themselves inflate the cost of failure.16 
                                                          
11 Perhaps Thomas Edison put it best when he allegedly explained “I have not failed. I’ve just found 10,000 ways 
that won’t work.” 
12 John Donohue, Fail Fast, Fail Often, Fail Everywhere, THE NEW YORKER, May 31, 2015, 
http://www.newyorker.com/business/currency/fail-fast-fail-often-fail-everywhere. 
13 When economist Richard Cantillon first used the term “entrepreneur” in the modern sense, he defined it as a 
“bearer of risk.” James Surowiecki, Epic Fails of the Startup World, THE NEW YORKER May 19, 2014, 
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/05/19/epic-fails-of-the-startup-world. 
14 Data was not available for Bahrain, the UAE, or any other Gulf countries 
15 SLAIVA SINGER, JOSÉ ERNESTO AMORÓS, & DANIEL MOSKA, GLOBAL ENTREPRENSUERHIP ASSOCIATION, GLOBAL 
ENTREPRENEURSHIP MONITOR 2014 GLOBAL REPORT 32 (2015). 
16 Id. at 33. For an insightful look at personal grief as another social cost of failure, see Dean A. Sheperd, Learning 
from Business Failure: Propositions of Grief Recovery for the Self-Employed, 28 ACAD. MGMT. REV., 318 (2003). 
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III. Bankruptcy 
 Laws and institutions are less ephemeral than social mores which makes them more 
suitable candidates for academic study. Of all the legal institutions that could potentially affect 
entrepreneurship, the most important, or perhaps just the most observable, is bankruptcy.17 
Although bankruptcy is a sign of complete failure, it is not necessarily a corporate death knell. 
The topic at hand would be ill-served by an exploration of the darkest corners of bankruptcy law, 
but the point must be made that bankruptcy can take many forms and that each of these forms 
imposes a different level of cost on the bankrupt entrepreneur. This paper focuses particularly on 
the effect of bankruptcy regimes on entrepreneurship in the Gulf for three reasons. First, 
bankruptcy laws have an observable effect on entrepreneurship. Second, legislatures can change 
bankruptcy laws more easily than they can reform other relevant laws or institutions. Third, and 
the inspiration for this paper, Islamic law makes bankruptcy extraordinarily costly for 
entrepreneurs. 
Link between bankruptcy and entrepreneurship 
The cost of bankruptcy theoretically affects entrepreneurs’ incentives during three distinct 
time periods. The first time period occurs when the potential entrepreneur is still deciding 
whether or not to start a business. Armour and Cummings posit that during this period, a high 
cost of bankruptcy will reduce the ex ante incentive to start a business.18 All else equal, “more 
severe legal penalties for bankruptcy will . . . tend to make marginal would-be entrepreneurs less 
                                                          
17 Studies have found that other elements of corporate law such as minority shareholder rights, anti-director rights, 
and creditor rights do not have an effect on the level of venture capital (a close proxy for entrepreneurship) in a 
market. John Armour & Douglas Cumming, The Legislative Road to Silicon Valley, 58 OXFORD ECON. PAPERS 596, 
600 (2006). This is not surprising given that venture capital rights are usually the product of investment contracts 
and not corporate law generally. Id. 
18 Id. at 602 (citing Wei Fan & Michelle J. White, Personal Bankruptcy and the Level of Entrepreneurial Activity, 46 
J. Law Econ. 543 (2003)). 
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willing to leave paid employment so as to pursue innovative business ideas.”19 This does, of 
course, assume that potential entrepreneurs are rationally factoring the expected cost of future 
bankruptcy into their decisions. The second time period for which bankruptcy laws affect 
entrepreneurial incentives is after a company has been founded but before it declares bankruptcy. 
Strict bankruptcy rules provide an extra incentive to succeed before bankruptcy, after the 
entrepreneur has invested resources in the business.20 Finally, a costly bankruptcy regime 
impairs the ability of an entrepreneur to succeed after bankruptcy. Entrepreneurs are better able 
to succeed if they are not “encumbered by debt obligations carried over from [their] previous 
failure.”21 This is how a low-cost bankruptcy regime allows entrepreneurs to adopt the lean 
startup’s fail-fast mentality for complete failures. As Kenneth Ayotte explained, “[i]f bankruptcy 
legally disables failed entrepreneurs from re-engaging in business, then they only have one 
chance to fail. Conversely, a readily available fresh start means that failed entrepreneurs can be 
rapidly rehabilitated.”22 This interpretation of bankruptcy is not limited to the niche situation of 
startup companies. In the 1933 case of Local Loan v. Hunt the Supreme Court expressed that the 
goal of a functional bankruptcy regime was to give “the honest but unfortunate debtor . . . a new 
opportunity in life and a clear field for future effort, unhampered by the pressure and 
discouragement of preexisting debt.’’23 
 Empirical studies have confirmed that lower bankruptcy costs lead to higher levels of 
entrepreneurship. Looking at trade association data from 15 different countries, Armour and 
                                                          
19 Id. 
20 Kenneth Ayotte, Bankruptcy and Entrepreneurship: The Value of a Fresh Start, 23 J. L., Econ, & Organization 
161, 161-62 (2006) 
21 Id. at 179. 
22 Id. (citing, Nicholas L. Georgakopoulos, Bankruptcy Law for Productivity, 37 Wake Forest L. Rev 51 (2002)). 
23 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934). 
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Cumming concluded that “countries in which a fresh start is available systematically have 
greater levels of fundraising and profits” for entrepreneurs.24 In a more in-depth study, Lee et al. 
similarly found that lower risk filing bankruptcy correlates with higher numbers of new firms 
being founded.25  
Ability to change bankruptcy regimes 
Unlike other institutions that affect levels of entrepreneurship, bankruptcy regimes are 
susceptible to legislative changes.26 Social mores, for instance, cannot be quickly or easily 
changed—especially not through governmental action. Even if an entrepreneur-friendly 
government has the power to change other legal institution, it may find it difficult to identify the 
exact changes that need to be made. For bankruptcy, Lee et al. found four different components 
of bankruptcy law that are shown to affect levels of entrepreneurship: time spent on bankruptcy 
procedure, money spent on bankruptcy procedure, amount of debt discharged in bankruptcy, and 
presence of automatic stays of assets under bankruptcy laws.27 Using these findings, a legislature 
would have specific guidance on how to overhaul its bankruptcy regime to be more conducive to 
entrepreneurship. Another option that has been suggested by some scholars is to avoid 
overhauling the country’s entire bankruptcy regime and instead adopt a separate bankruptcy 
procedure specifically for entrepreneurs.28 
                                                          
24 Armour & Cumming, supra note 17, at 612. 
25 Lee, et al, supra note 2, at 516–17. 
26 Id. at 506. Lower time and money costs are associated with higher levels of entrepreneurship; higher amounts of 
debt discharged is associated with higher levels of entrepreneurship; and presence of automatic stays is associated 
with lower levels of entrepreneurship. Id. at 516. 
27 Id. at 509.  
28 Ayotte, supra note 17, at 161. 
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Bankruptcy Laws and Islamic Finance 
Before evaluating the impact of Islamic bankruptcy law on entrepreneurship, it is worth 
discussing the role that Islamic law plays in the Gulf States’ legal systems. Shari’a (Arabic for 
“path”) is a set of religious beliefs that “guides all aspects of Muslim life.”29 Shari’a law is not, 
however, ported directly into the laws of the Gulf States at a one-to-one ratio. Rather, Shari’a “is 
by law either a source or the primary source” of many majority-Muslim countries’ national 
legislation.30 A simple example of shari’a law in practice is in the field of family law. Shari’a 
prescribes specific rules for marriage and divorce.31 But a country with a dual legal system like 
the UAE will have two separate courts: a secular court for non-Muslims to adjudicate matters of 
family law and a shari’a court for Muslims to do the same. What follows is a description of 
bankruptcy under shari’a law. Therefore, it is not necessarily a restatement of bankruptcy law in 
any specific country, but an overview of the role that Islam plays in creating a bankruptcy 
regime. 
Bankruptcy under shari’a law, called iflas,32 is fairly straightforward and occurs either 
when debt exceeds assets or when expenditures exceed revenue.33 The bankrupt entity, whether 
it is an individual or business enterprise, is referred to as the muflis.34 What separates iflas from 
bankruptcy in legal systems like the one found in the U.S. is that the muflis is never permanently 
                                                          
29 Toni Johnson & Mohammed Aly Sergie, Islam: Governing under Sharia, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 
(2014), http://www.cfr.org/religion/islam-governing-under-sharia/p8034. 
30 Abed Awad & Robert E. Michael, Iflas and Chapter 11: Classical Islamic Law and Modern Bankruptcy, 44 INT'L 
LAW 975, 975 (2010). 
31 Johnson & Sergie, supra note 29, at 2. 
32 Awad & Michael, supra note 30, at 980 (citing THE HANS WEHER DICTIONARY OF MODERN ARABIC 850 (J.M. 
Cowan ed., 1994). 
33 Id. at 985. 
34 Id. at 980. 
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discharged of its debts. “[O]nce one is a muflis, there are only two ways that status ends; full 
repayment of all unforgiven debts or death.”35 Furthermore, shari’a law does not allow for entity 
shielding used to protect individuals from debt liability.36 However, this apparent harshness is 
balanced by the countervailing requirement that the muflis who is in financial troubles need not 
pay back his debts until he is financially able.37  
Using the above-described framework, the shari’a bankruptcy regime should 
theoretically exert two different influences on potential entrepreneurs. On the one hand, a would 
be entrepreneur might be more willing to start a business because he knows that, should the 
business ultimately end in complete failure, he will not have to pay any debts until he is 
financially able. On the other hand, once an entrepreneur encounters his first complete failure 
and assumes iflas status, it will be exceedingly difficult for him to start a second business. 
Further empirical research on this subject might identify the equilibrium point between these 
competing forces but I would expect shari’a bankruptcy law to have a negative net effect on 
entrepreneurship. In a lean startup ecosystem that relies on iteration through trial-and-error, serial 
entrepreneurs—those entrepreneurs who continually found new business after previous successes 
or failures—play an important role in innovation. If entrepreneurs are not given a second shot at 
starting a business, then they lose the ability to learn from their own mistakes. 
                                                          
35 Id. The textual justification for this treatment comes verse 5:1 of the Quran: “O you who believe, you shall fulfill 
your covenants.” THE QURAN (Abed Awad trans., Penguin Classics, 2008). 
36 Awad & Michael, supra note 30, at 984 (“All personal and economic activities are conducted through either direct 
proprietary ownership or one of the 'nominate' forms of partnership that were approved by the jurists.”). 
37 Id. at 980–81 (citing, THE QURAN 2:280 (Abed Awad trans., Penguin Classics, 2008) (“If a person is in 
difficulties, let there be respite until a time of ease. And if you give freely it would be better for you, if only you 
knew.”)). 
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IV. Other Opportunities for Entrepreneurs in the Gulf 
Finally, a discussion of entrepreneurship in the Gulf requires careful attention to 
government programs meant to bolster the local entrepreneurial environment. My studies in 
Qatar, Bahrain, and the UAE revealed many different government-sponsored programs meant to 
help entrepreneurs start their business. These programs include direct funding for 
entrepreneurs,38 government programs that provide resources and expertise for entrepreneurs,39 
and startup “incubators” like you would find in the U.S. that provide funding and guidance for 
entrepreneurs.40 A deeper analysis of these government programs would require further research 
to balance the needs of local entrepreneurs with the expected efficacy of such programs. 
Depending on how they are set up, government programs that fund entrepreneurs can 
have a negative impact on entrepreneurial financing via a crowding-out effect.41 In the U.S., 
Armour and Cumming found that government investment had a 100-percent crowding-out 
effect—it neither increased nor decreased total early stage investment in startups.42 Although 
Armour and Cumming assert that their U.S. findings should hold true for other countries “even 
accounting for the possible endogeneity of government programs to low national levels of 
                                                          
38 In Bahrain, the government program Tamkeen provides incentive-based funding for small businesses. TAMKEEN, 
http://www.tamkeen.bh/en/ (last visited Jan. 21, 2017). In the UAE, the Khalifa fund uses its capital of AED 2 
billion to “create a new generation of Emirati entrepreneurs.” KHALIFA FUND, 
https://www.khalifafund.ae/SitePages/Home.aspx (last visited Jan. 31, 2016). 
39 Examples in the UAE include Dubai SME, an organization with the goal to “promote innovation and leadership 
across all segments of the small and medium enterprise sector,” and the Centre for Entrepreneurship and Innovation 
at the University of Dubai, a partnership with San Diego State University designed help Dubai become “the global 
leader in entrepreneurship and innovation.” DUBAI SME, http://www.sme.ae/English/aboutus/Pages/default.aspx 
(last visited Jan. 31, 2016); CEI, http://www.ud.ac.ae/en/cei (last visited Jan. 31, 2016). 
40 These include the Qatari Business Incubation Centre in Doha, and InFive and the Dubai Technology 
Entrepreneurship Centre in Dubai. QBIC, http://www.qbic.qa/ (last visited Jan. 31, 2016); INFIVE, http://infive.ae/ 
(last visited Jan. 31, 2016); DTEC, http://dtec.ae/ (last visited Jan. 31, 2016). 
41 Armour & Cumming, supra note 17, at 601. 
42 Id. at 602. 
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venture capital activity,” empirical studies in the Gulf region are required to confirm that a 
substantial startup-financing industry would emerge if not for government interference. 
V. Conclusion 
 Gulf countries have recently taken action to increase local levels of entrepreneurship and 
attract innovative companies. As these economies move forward in fostering entrepreneurship, 
they will face many challenges: providing technical infrastructure, attracting sources of venture 
capital, providing visas for entrepreneurs with no existing sponsor-company. But one of the 
challenges that will be most addressable through legal structures is creating a bankruptcy regime 
that lowers the cost of entrepreneurial failure. Low failure costs will, in turn, increase the 
incentive for new entrepreneurs to start business, allow failed entrepreneurs to have a second 
chance, and ultimately provide social gain through innovation. 
 
